Abstract: DDR3 DRAMs, after a long period of floundering about, wondering 'when they would happen', have gained much traction in the marketplace in the past six months. With new efficient and high-performance DDR3 designs in production at all major DRAM makers, they are clearly on their way to "PC DRAM Domination", though today they are still only about 20% of total DRAM shipments. The DDR2-to-DDR3 Rubicon is crossed, though many uncertinaties lie ahead as the industry simultaneously moves through its painful consolidative phase, desperate to restore profitability, and to 50nm processing, across-the-board efficient 6Fsq cells and a hit-and-miss transition to uniform 1.35V operation by all vendors in all applications by the end of 2010. Today's DDR3 take-ups in PCs are 'incrementally faster, definitely lower power'...and are appearing in 2Q's genration of laptop product line refreshes, more than in desktop systems. Power, low power, is increasingly a co-equal driving force for DDR3 adoption.

What has changed since late 2008: As late as 3Q and 4Q08, DDR3 DRAMs could only be found in high-end game PCs, where they were attractive for their higher performance, and where the market could support their higher prices. In early fall, DDR3 DRAMs still cost 2x-4x DDR2, though admittedly, DDR2s were at something of an all time historical low of 60 cents. Today, DDR2 prices have come up a lot, and are now in the $1.05-$1.20 range for 1Gb ($9 or $10 for 1GB DIMM), closing the gap from the bottom. But newer DDR3 designs have also reduced the earlier die-area disadvantages, thus reducing production costs. And DRAM makers seem to have decided, 'If we are shipping $1 with every 1Gb DRAM, it might as well be a DDR3 DRAMs, which has a future...and that Taiwan's price bombers do not have yet to any appreciable degree.'

At the crossover speeds, DDR2 800/1066 and DDR3 1066, prices are very close to one another. At DDR3-1333, there is a mixed and sometimes significant premium for DDR3 compared to slower DDR2s, which, if the history of DDR1 and DDR2 pricing is any guide, will be whittled down to nothing in a few quarters' production and use. DDR3-1600 is still not found in any PCs that we have seen...but for DDR2, recall DDR2-533 was kicked off 3Q04, DDR2-667 took up 1Q06, and DDR2-800 was really a 'post-mid-2008' phenomena (and still growing, displacing -667s)

Low Voltage DDR3: Last year, the industry devised an alternate Low Voltage Roadmap for DRAMs. The standard DDR3 spec called for 1.5V operation, which had been decided nearly a decade ago. The low voltage roadmap agreed on last year calls for a 1.35V option, designated DDR3L, which saves about 20% in power (subject to many other considerations and conditions, of course). But most vendors can hit the performance spec even with this reduced voltage, so it is expected to be adopted widely; all major DRAM makers have 1.35V product and roadmaps; Samsung and Micron announced DDR3L server DIMMs and SO DIMMs a few days ago, for (almost) everyday applications...and it is only a matter of time before "L" comes to dominate DDR3 production. There is also an even more agressive 1.2V discussion and emerging DDR3 (or DDR4) spec, but it is still too remote to forecast the timing and extent of adoption...but the preponderance of heat-spreaders on DDR3 DIMMs should give some indication of where the power problems lie.

DRAM makers have consistently been able to produce the top speed grade at high yields, for DDR1 (>-400 to -600) and DDR2 (>-800/1066 to -2100), so they have wisely been reducing the operaing voltages, for 'green considerations' without compromising premium sales.

For users, this "L" roadmap is 'free' power reduction.

Off the charts, too: While the DDR3 specs are -800, -1066, -1333 and -1600, an additional bin at -2133 is under discussion...mostly aimed at PC makers. However, there is a vibrant market for gamers and overclockers, which offers many other variations...-1800, -2000, and Elpida's fastest-to-date, 2.5GHz 'technology showpiece'. These varieties may calm down in the next twelve months, as the -2133 spec moves forward for affirmation.

For most vendors, DDR3 will really take of with their nom 50nm DDR3 designs, which will be hugely productive (die/300mm wafer) and could be DRAM maker's ticket to profitability in 2010.

Summary: Unity Semiconductor has come forth recently with a new candidate for Storage Class Memory technology, CMOx, which uses metal oxides as the data storage medium, and changing the presence of those oxides by application of an electric field. CMOx looks promising, cost-competitive with the roadmap potentials for existing silicon NVMs, high-enough performance, and scalable to under 20nm. But we are still two years from seeing something close to first production material, at densities and possible costs that will enable us to really check the early returns and expectations, against realities. For now, we can only stay tuned.

The Company: Unity has 42 employees, with a wide range of semiconductor pedigrees from Inmos, Micron, Fairchild, Ramtron, Simtek, and AMD. It is headed by Darrell Rinerson, formerly an Executive at Micron Technology, who with two others founded the company in 2002. Darrell is the lead patent developer listed on most of the patent plaques lining the entry hall of the companies' Sunnyvale facility.

Now seven years old in development, and with a total of $75M in three rounds of funding, Unity is confident enough in its technology and roadmap to start talking to manufacturing partners, as it concurrently moves product and technology development from 'proof of concept' to 'characterization' and something close to 'production-readiness' over the next two years.

Should this technology pan out in a way close to what early analyses and tests have indicated is possible, at equivalent process nodes, CMOx can be expected to have 4x the density of NAND flash, 5x the write speed of NAND, and require little in the way of special processing flows. Compared to MLC NAND's 2F2 cell size, CMOx's is merely 0.5F2, and it has no transistor to limit extreme scaling. Though still two years away from production-readiness' CMOx memories are being positioned as something of 'The Mother of All Storage Class Memories' that are taking aim at sockets where conventional silicon cannot reach for price or performance reasons. Conceivably, CMOx could even replace HDDs, and expand markets into heretofore unidentified markets, applications and products.

These are 'Great Expectations', to be sure, and a long road to travel between today's 64Mb test vehicle, now undergoing characterization in Unity's labs, and its 64Gb device, scheduled to be available in 1H11.

Novel manufacturing process flow: With the Unity CMOx storage cell technology innovation, other important business and manufacturing decisions can change. For one, for the first several masking layers, Unity's wafers can effectively use a standard bulk CMOS process, at a back generation process node, for the FEOL. They can buy common 90nm processes wafers for their CMOx memory feedstock. These 'pre-uncommitted memory arrays' are then transferred to a more state-of-the-art BEOL, for the metal oxide and metal layers, and deposition and building of the actual storage features.

'Go to market'...how, exactly? Furthermore, in the midst of today's memory meltdown, Unity is very interested in its own go-to-market model, and intent on devising a method of taking its product to market without creating the overly-commoditized bloodbath we have seen for more than a year in DRAMs and NAND flash. For this, their 'plan of record' today is to join forces with an existing memory manufacturing partner, and have limited production sufficient to service that market that can use the superior performance of CMOx (at a price, to be sure). Of course, they will have to weigh carefully the option of reducing prices and broadening the market...but this decision will have to wait until the product itself is fully characterized and the existing and potential 'high value niches' better understood.

Unity is convinced that broad licensing of CMOx would collapse the market into a food-fight, and leave everyone with nothing, as it has, periodically, for traditional DRAM and NAND flash licensing programs almost since the industry's inception.

Licensing, adoption, production: evidence and options:

To add some perspective to this problem, specifically that of the owner of a potentially valuable "Memory IP", it is worthwhile to see other ways of 'going to market'. These days, Pure IP Developers are denigrated in some quarters as being 'patent trolls', leaches and worse. They 'make' nothing, and are viewed as riding on the backs of those who do make products. Historically, IP developers made products that demonstrated the value of their IP, and got paid in product profits. Sometimes 'secret sauce' of proprietary but undisclosed and unpatented technolgies, remained out of view for years from competitors. But, especially among the industry's early founders, broad cross-licensing took place, and no one was denied access to any other technical developments in their field, though license and royalties flowed continuously. That started to change in the mid-1980s with a huge TI patent offensive against DRAM makers, and was turned on its head entirely with the founding of Rambus in 1990s, who was the first pure-play IP company in the industry.

The conundrum is that however much the IP costs, the cost use it in a DRAM/memory/semiconductor product, and take it to market, is far greater, with today's $3B memory fabs and established channels to customers. A standalone IP developer has to find a manufacturing partner to bring his ideas to life in the marketplace, and to profitabliity. And, even if one has an allegedly superior capability, it is no guarantee of a big money stream, and there is never any guarantee that it is 'forever.'.

Rambus DRAMs have demonstrated superior performance to standard DDR1-2-3 for more than a decade now, but have not enjoyed significant take-up in the market, and have thrust Rambus themselves into a never-ending sea of lawsuits...which pariah status Unity seeks to avoid.

There are, of course, instances of sustained significant technical leadership and profitability from time to time in the semiconductor memory business, but, as all the players have the same basic tool box (or, sandbox, since its silicon), eventually Intel loses its HS 1K and 4K SRAM monopoly to Hitachi, Inmos and AMD; Samsung loses its 8M WRAM monopoly to DDR1 and wide IO, Standard G DRAMs and IBM loses its UHS SRAM sales leverage with customers Sun and HP, (sustained at $140/8M unit for years) to Samsung, and then GSI (though other factors were at work there, too.) System manufacturers are highly adept at working around costly components in their systems (see "History of RL DRAM"), as are the thousands of engineers working on new materials and methods at working around what appear to be an insurmountable patent position. Wang Labs x9 SIMM patents, earning them a cool $90M in the early '90s, became worthless with the onset of x32/x36 DIMMs. CDMA technology from Qualcomm is a non-memory example, with which they have generated a significant monopoly profit stream AND widespread adoption for many years, though not without a battle at every juncture.

Rambus, Wang Labs and sometimes Qualcomm (and formerly, TI) have engendered some intense bad feelings in the industry by the way they 'exploited' their IP...which they feel is just getting paid for their technical contributions, "and if you don't like it...'

Balancing what some would call 'IP greed' with market needs and 'ability to pay' is a hard act to manage, as we have seen many times. Broad licensing and cross licensing of IP has been the common industry practice since its earliest days; good for the consumer, but maybe not for the IP holders or other intermediaries, who cannot differentiate their products.

Unity's manufacturing partnership plan is their way of limiting access to their technology, bringing production only to a level of a manageable market presence that shows good profitability in those applications that can appreciate CMOx unique capabilities. Once the show hits the road in 2011, we will see how well this works. (Saifun faced a similar quandary when they developed NROM technology...be an IP company or build a fab? This was discussed in an early DMR article.).

The Challenges Ahead: This looks like a promising technology worth watching. Only more time and more development and characterizations, and more critical evaluation in real-life applications, will tell us if CMOx is as good as it now looks. Many other technologies looked good for a while, but ran into cost, scalability, or performance challenges that could not be successfully overcome. MRAM was all the talk 3-4 years ago, but has given way to Phase Change Memories (PCMs) today as the most talked-about heir apparent to the extensible silicon roadmap on scaled NAND flash. With technical roots, and claims of Universal Memory Domination dating back at least to the early 1980s, Numonyx informs us in a press release from last December that they shipped the industry's first PCM memory for revenue in 4Q08.

In addition, the Status Quo is not standing still; silicon NAND marches on, downward in cost, towards and beyond 30nm processing by the time the first CMOx 64Gb device is shipped in 2011.

But if these claims come anywhere close to standing up under two more years of development and scrutiny, CMOx's domain will extend far beyond where we see silicon NVMs applied today...'cheaper and faster' is a hard to beat combination.

Taiwan Cannot Shake Attraction for DRAMs, Marches Down Same Path as Many Others Before Them

Abstract: Taiwan wants to be a big player in DRAMs, which we believe is a losing proposition and a strategic mistake, not only for Taiwan but for all DRAM makers. They should embrace their strengths and domination of the worldwide foundry business, repurpose some of those DRAM fabs to make next generation logic, and expand their design and logic foundry franchises. They have much more to lose in foundry than they have to gain in DRAMs...in fact, DRAMs is a sinkhole for money and has been for more than a decade. In the current climate of industry consolidation, megafabs and hegemony for large markets, and the move to fablessness as a superior business model, it is not even an open question which path is better for Taiwan: Foundry logic trumps DRAMs, now and forever.

Taiwan Wants to Make DRAMs After a very tough year-long DRAM market that began in the waning days of 2007, we are now well into the next phase...a more than nine-month agony emanating from Taiwan as is searches for DRAM relief in a variety of proposed consolidation arrangements among the island's DRAM makers. The "Powers That Be" in Taiwan, want to own their own DRAM IP and designs, to consolidate operations to reduce redundancies in design and development, to gain scale, and be large enough and tough enough to compete (mainly) with the Koreans. DRAM market leader Samsung and side-kick and rival Hynix, which own about 30% and 18% of the DRAM business, respectively, each makes more than ALL of Taiwan's DRAM makers combined: Powerchip, Nanya, ProMOS, Winbond, Rexchip and Inotera, plus or minus some allowance for Taiwan-based DRAM production which is owned by and built for non-Taiwanese DRAM makers (namely, Micron (JV Inotera) and Elpida (Powerchip and JV Rexchip), now that Qimonda is out of play). Taiwan has set for itself a formibable goal, from a weak position today, in a very tough and unforgiving market.

DRAM makers, worldwide, lost about $20B in the 2001-03 aftermath of the dot.com bubble bursting, and have lost another $30B this cycle, from late 2007 though the middle of 2009.

Taiwan's DRAM makers themselves have lost about $1B per quarter for the past six quarters (see table below), and hold huge amounts of debt, said to be in the vicinity of US$14B. When the 'profit' numbers for 2Q09 are tallied, another $1B will be gone forever. And, despite a long time coming in discussion, no firm plan seems to have emerged from the Taiwan Memory Corp., except to anoint Elpida with the title of "Taiwan's DRAM IP Savior", to plan to invest about US$300M for a 10% stake in Elpida to bolster its cash position, and to merge ProMOS into the larger TMC/Elpida entity. What this may mean for long-time Elpida partner Powerchip and its Rexchip JV, is not said, but likely they are automatic members of Club Elpida.

Details in the public domain are scarce and it is truly a moving target, but clearly it is much more modest in scope than that which was proposed last fall, which had a scale that was rumored to be as high as US$6B in available funding. We will not know for sure, until there is a formal announcement, and maybe not even then, as huge uncertainties are sure to exist about the arrangement.

What we do know is that it is now about nine months since conversations began, nothing has happened except Taiwan's DRAM makers have kept capacity on line, continued to make DRAMs, and lost another $3B.

The Koreans are the dominant DRAM players today. With their unique corporate culture, with huge financial resources at their disposal and a gambler's penchant to go 'all in', alone, make them formidable. Add to this their incumbent's advantages, their market position, their product set, design skills, manufacturing capacity, technology and experience, and one can see that they are way ahead of Taiwan in many important measures of market success. If history is any guide, they would probably not be dislodged without a large and expensive fight. "Last Man Standing" takes on a whole new meaning when Koreans are in the market.

Samsung's Greatness: Samsung makes twice as many DRAMs as all of Taiwan, owns most of their own DRAM technology (self-developed since Yong Park designed their 256K on Old Ironsides Drive in Santa Clara in 1984), has many DRAM designs in production, concurrently, down to the 40nm node as technology-proving vehicles. They are the driving force in JEDEC in both the NAND flash and DRAMs standards bodies, have a broad and profit-protective portfolio of LP DRAMs (50% share), Dense Server DIMMs (80% share?), and are the G DRAM market leader (>50% share). They are the original Market Creator and Market Leader for NAND flash, with a relatively stable 40% share, and a competitive #3 (belatedly) to Spansion and Numonyx in NOR flash, which remains a $5B business even in 2008.

Samsung has led and dominated every memory market they participated in, for as long as they wanted.

Furthermore, for Samsung, it would probably be a bad business decision to chase more than ~35-40% share of these huge, highly commoditized markets, susceptible to 'price dumping' by DRAM and NAND minions at home and abroad, and general production gluts (as in 'today'). Below-cost prices may hurt Powerchip a lot, but will impact Samsung, whose share is 10x larger, way more, in absolute if not relative terms. And, there has always been a "suicide bomber" in every DRAM downturn since 1979...they kill themselves, to be sure, but take as many innocent bystanders with them, who are too close to the explosion. The recent trend to "Pure Memory Players" exacerbates this potential: "We will not exit memories gracefully, if and since that is the only thing we have." Few memory makers have ever 'reinvented themselves'; most died of low prices and high losses.

With high shares in all major memory markets, Samsung may not grow its memory share more from today, but will improve its memory profitability; for growth, they will have to find greener pastures and still-unfamiliar markets.

Now, add in Hynix, which, by itself, is also about as large as all of Taiwan DRAM makers combined, and who is forever in the thrall of its bankers, anxious to see their investment pan out. Given their apparent willingness to throw good money after bad, and firm in the belief (or so it seems) that all that money invested can again turn green...if the competition gives up first. Unlike Taiwan, as well, Hynix has some good differentiated DRAMs, used in graphics and LP Memory applications...plus NAND flash. Hynix by itself, a distant second in all things memory to Samsung, is still out of reach for Taiwan.

Taiwan, on the other hand, gets hand-me down processes from their partners, six months after development (IBM, Qimonda then Micron to Nanya, Qimonda then Hynix to ProMOS, Mitsubishi then Elpida to Powerchip, Qimonda and self-developed to Winbond), are centered in the sights of commodity DRAMs (having only a small fraction of differentiated DRAMs), and minimize their development costs by paying for technology transfers ahead of time.

We believe that Taiwan, in focusing on strengthening its DRAM capabilities to fend off Korean DRAM dominance, is placing a bad bet, and the wrong bet. The world does not need another DRAM maker, it needs some substantial DRAM capacity taken off line, and restrained DRAM investment going forward. After two strong DRAM GB growth years, of 90% and 70% Y/Y in 2007 and 2008, respectively, 2009 promises to be a bust in terms of DRAM demand growth: pundits are calling it 20-30% Y/Y, the worst in a decade. Reductions in wafer starts are the only way to keep DRAM GB growth down that low for a year, as the steady and 'inertial' yield improvements, scheduled die shrinks and winnowing out back die versions naturally leading to more than 35-40% bit growth without adding a single wafer.

Competitively, as well, Samsung is just too big, too entrenched, and too far ahead for Taiwan to compete with head on. Samsung Electronics is a huge $60B/year electronics business, with high market share and profitable positions in mobile phones and LCD panels, both of which can feed their chip business with whatever it takes to dominate the business. Rightly or wrongly, 'fairly' or 'unfairly', this is an important aspect of Korean corporate culture that must be reckoned with. Hynix' 'family and sponsors' will stop at nothing to stay afloat, as we saw in the 2001-03 dot.com bubble aftershock.

If Taiwan wants to do battle with Samsung/Hynix/Korea, they should do it in foundries, logic and manufacturing logistics, and high-value add designs...where they have a head start and a huge advantage...vs. their 'fire and forget, huge commodity' mentality that permeates most memory makers' way of thinking and doing business.

Sure, it will/would be a good story if Taiwan were to win and establish a sustainable (and profitable) DRAM position. The story would be great: "'The Comeback Kid', How Taiwan's DRAM Business Rose from the Ashes to Become a World Leader"...but what if they lose?...and why not apply themselves in an area where 'Victory' and 'Success' are far more likely, and aligned more with their current strengths and market trends?

Samsung's Foundry Possibilities: Further and finally to this argument, Samsung, The Memory Guy, took 40nm Xilinx FPGA business away from UMC within the past six months, and was reported sniffing about in Taiwan's foundries for skilled employees to hire away. (see relevant footnote on Samsung DRAM offensive, ca. 1990, below).

Although Samsung's System LSI business and 'other' have languished in ignominy for a decade, they show sparks of excellence, and know that they cannot overtake Intel (or grow their sales and profits much more) by relying only on memories. They have been a part of the IBM-led Common Technology Platform roadmap development consortium for many years; they have their own developing ASIC group, and take in foundry (in addition to Xilinx, noted above.) Their System LSI Group is running about $2B a year...a pittance by Samsung memory standards, but it would easily rank in the Top 20 in world chip sales by itself.

Taiwan's Strengths, Taiwan' Exposure and Taiwan's Opportunity: Why "Taiwan" would want to challenge Samsung, or Korea, in DRAMs, is a question that has not been satisfactorily answered in the discussion so far.

But a more important way to look at the problem is to ask, "What are Taiwan's strengths and what are its opportunities?" As we discussed in an earlier BLOG, Taiwan is more of an entrepreneurial culture, against the large Chaebols ('authoritarian' family-owned businesses) of Korea. It is more democratic in decision-making, and less prone to be run by diktat, as the Korean companies are. In Taiwan, there are fewer cozy government-banking-corporate tie-ins than there are in Korea, or than there are in Japan...which tie-ins have some competitive advantages when played against smaller, and more disassociated entities such as are found in Taiwan. Anyone can play in a market with the Koreans, but they play at their own peril, and usually with huge disadvantages in the power that can be asserted in a market, seemingly without regard to profit or damage potential. Though there is a fine line between 'thinking long term' and investing foolishly, somehow Korea manages to make it work. American driveways filled with Kias and Hyundai Sonatas attest to their perseverance and skill.

To see Taiwan's strengths, one has to look no further than TSMC and UMC, the #1 and #2 pure-play foundries, with 50% and 15%, respectively, of the worldwide foundry business. TSMC had sales of more than US$10B in 2008; UMC had sales of more than US$3B in 2008.

This is the Glory of Taiwan, and it is right in the path of perhaps the most important trend in the industry today, 'fablessness for finer line geometries'. It is these next-generation processes that are increasingly expensive to develop by oneself, and will drive more and more companies to lean on foundries as the industry moves forward to advanced process nodes, in the coming years.

In the Industry's Consolidative Phase, Fablessness is Fabulous. As process development costs hockey stick up at 65nm and then 45nm and 32nm, as fab costs approach $3B per megafab, the drumbeat of fab-lite, fablessness and 'mere' design houses, resonates more loudly...and more profitably. While outsourcing of chip manufacturing is said to be in the vicinity of 20% of total chip sales in 2008, an increasing fraction of the industry's profits are to be found there...far from the idle fabs, rusting with depreciation as NAND and DRAM demand lulls, far from those huge capex budgets which strangle the higher-value-add design programs that form the value proposition in end systems into which they are sold, and shut off the profit stream of the whole of the silicon food chain. Fablessness also takes one far from the specialty processes that require constant attention to maintain competitiveness, against products and markets which are forever morphing, and/or wanting to morph into other markets, process requirements and functionalities. This is a huge exposure to a smaller producer...to develop a one- or two-generation process roadmap, then abandon it.

This is the accelerating wave of the coming industry recovery, as high-value logic, ASIC and SoC implementations make Intelligent Designs more production-justifiable and more valuable to everyone in the silicon food chain, than 'mere' bulk bits' (sold at a loss, to be sure). With the current industry 'pause', painful as it is, Taiwan now some slack time to rethink its mission, to take stock of its available resources and skills and reset its industry direction. Through its leading foundries, it is uniquely positioned to become even more dominant in the next stage of industry evolution. Sinking more money into DRAMs is a fool's errand, that will bring good to no one.

Footnote for Consideration: Samsung DRAM Offensive, ca. 1990 Samsung (as "TriStar"...its corporate/family logo) came on the DRAM scene in about 1983, after being the best Korean 'regional semiconductor player' for many years. With great fanfare, LG Goldstar, Hyundai (incarnate in the US as "Modern Electrosystems"), and Samsung all joined hands and jumped in to the world chip business. Not being shy, soon thereafter, Samsung declared its goal to become the #1 Chipmaker by the year 2000. Well, not quite, and not quite yet. But recall that this declaration was made when Intel was about #10 in the industry rankings, behind five Japanese (NEC, Hitachi, Mitsubishi, Fujitsu, Toshiba), TI and Motorola, and two Europeans (Philips, Siemens = Infineon).

But, barely were the Korean's feet wet when the Tsunami of 1985 hit, and forced major retreats and reconsiderations by all three companies. On the surface, they retreated to more traditional corporate names: "TriStar" reverted back to "Samsung Semiconductor", and "Modern Electrosystems" became, nce more, "Hyundai Semiconductor". And, "Goldstar" stayed the same, at least for a while.

They continued progressing on the technology front, but their big day only came when the Japanese Meltdown began in the early 1990s, leaving a huge market void...a DRAM void...to be filled with Korean DRAMs. Toshiba, Hitachi and NEC rode the end-of 1980's wave, but Samsung, with more money and more nerve, was in hot pursuit. When Toshiba showed signs of faltering in 1990, and whose 4Mb DRAM was not the market leader that their 1Mb had been, Samsung came into play with a vengeance.

Throwing down the gauntlet, Samsung hired the Top Guns from right from under Toshiba America's (TAEC) nose: Keith McDonald, TAEC's Director of Sales, Mark Ellsberry, the TAEC VP of Memory Marketing, and Mike Crawley, the TAEC Director of Distribution and Sales Reps, all came over to work for Samsung. Within a year, these three had a huge impact on improving the Samsung image to its customers, brought immense experience to reshape Samsung's DRAM business into the market leader it is today. As soon as 1992 came in, Samsung had risen to the top of the (DRAM) heap, and became the market leader, never to be headed off. Where each generation of DRAM had had a different market leader from 4K to 4M, Samsung has led every generation since.